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DIVISIBILITY OF COPYRIGHT: ITS APPLICATION
AND EFFECT
INTRODUCTION
The 1976 Copyright Revision Act' (hereinafter the new
Act) contains the first explicit statutory recognition of the
principle of divisibility of copyright in our law. This concept
simply takes notice of the fact that a copyright is a compila-
tion of many individual rights, and allows for the severability
of those rights.'
Under the doctrine of indivisibility, a copyright was
viewed as a unitary whole, incapable of being divided into
smaller, individual rights. That is, a copyright was assigned in
toto or else the conveyance was deemed to be a mere license.
Although the concept of indivisibility may have been in accord
with trade practices when first enunciated, it has become obso-
lete by virtue of the changing nature of the communications
media and the entertainment industry.
This comment will first examine the historical develop-
ment of indivisibility. It will then focus on some of the prob-
lems caused by the doctrine in the area of transfer of copyright
ownership, such as the right to claim copyright in a work and
the concommittant problem of standing to sue to protect that
copyright. Many of the problems of indivisibility point out the
need for divisible copyright. Since such problems are readily
visible in the area of magazine rights, this comment will focus
on periodicals as an illustration of these problems and the ef-
fect of divisibility on them. Finally, the area of co-ownership
will be explored and the suggestion made that the application
of divisibility of copyright is a potential solution to the prob-
lems in that area as well.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF INDIVISIBILITY
Early Precedent
The birth of indivisibility is often attributed to the deci-
sion of the United States Supreme Court in Waterman v.
a 1979 by Elliot Groffman.
1. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified in scattered sections of 2,
15, 17, 18, 26, 28, 39, 44 U.S.C.).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976). The five basic rights provided to the copyright owner
are reproduction, adaption, publication, performance, and display. Thus, the right to
produce a movie is severable from the right to publish the story upon which a movie
may be based.
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Mackenzie.' That leading patent case listed three types of per-
missible assignments: a grant of the entire patent, a grant of
an undivided share of the entire patent, or a grant of the exclu-
sive right under the patent for a specified geographical area of
the United States. The Court declared that "any assignment
or transfer, short of one of these, is a mere license, giving the
licensee no title in the patent, and no right to sue at law in his
own name for an infringement."4
Based on an analogy to patent law, lower courts devel-
oped the indivisibility doctrine and reshaped it into its most
popular usage. Early on, the doctrine came to mean that "a
copyright is an indivisible thing and cannot be split up and
partially assigned either as to time, place, or particular rights
or privileges, less than the sum of all the rights comprehended
in the copyright."'
The most often cited policy reason for adoption of indivisi-
bility was to protect alleged infringers from the harassment of
successive law suits.' Since licensees were unable to bring suit
and total assignments were required, the doctrine necessarily
limited the amount of people who could sue the alleged infrin-
ger.7
The Growth of Copyright
. No great hardship or injustice resulted from the doctrine
when first enunciated because of the limited scope of copyright
at the time. As one authority has noted, "the only effective
manner in which copyrighted materials could be exploited was
through the reproduction of copies." 8 Thus, the early need for
protection was against the unauthorized copying of books. This
was achieved through the recognition of the exclusive right to
copy which, as a practical matter, meant the exclusive right to
3. 138 U.S. 252 (1891). See Vanatta, Indivisibility of Copyright-An Obsolete
Doctrine, 37 U. CoLo. L. REV. 95 (1964).
4. 138 U.S. at 255. This decision was preceded by the earlier U.S. patent case of
Gaylor v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477 (1850), and the often-cited British case of
-Jeffreys v. Boosey, 10 Eng. Rep. 681 (1854).
5. M. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 F. 470, 475 (E.D.S.C.
1924); see Henn, Magazine Rights-A Division of Indivisible Copyright, 40 CORNELL
L.Q. 411, 417 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Henn].
6. Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252 (1891); New Fiction Publishing Co. v.
Star Co., 220 F. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1915). See 13 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
10.01A (1978) [hereinafter cited as NIMMERI; 23 ALA. L.REv. 169, 171 n.17 (1970);
Commissioner v. Wodehouse, 337 U.S. 369, 401 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
7. See text accompanying notes 46-56 infra.
8. NIMMER, supra note 6, at § 10-5.
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print.' However, the many developments in the communica-
tions media, 0 such as radio, television, movies, computers, sat-
ellite and cable television and microwave technology have
forced a changed perception of a copyright, now recognized as
a "label for a collection of diverse property rights, each of which
is separately marketable."" Before the recognition of that prin-
ciple, construing the scope of the exclusive rights involved in a
copyright was difficult.
Technological developments expanded the various meth-
ods of exploiting works of art.'" For example, when motion pic-
tures were first introduced, courts were faced with the issue of
whether a grant of "dramatic rights included 'motion picture
rights.' "11 The advent of television similarly raised issues as to
whether motion picture rights included television rights.'4
The indivisibility doctrine aggravated the problem of de-
termining the scope of exclusive rights. The circuitous transfer
methods' required in the periodical field resulted in the usage
of broad terminology and thus often created indistinguishable
rights. An author, pursuant to a standard retransfer arrange-
ment, might convey "all rights" to a magazine publisher ex-
pecting re-assignment after publication. If a question arose as
to who was the owner of the motion picture rights in the under-
lying work, a court would be forced to consider whether these
rights were within the scope of the original conveyance as well
as whether the conveyance was an assignment or license. This
distinction was replete with problems and often took on sub-
stantive significance with respect to ownership of exclusive
rights. 
Concurrent Growth in Use of Licenses
As new forms of exploitation in the various media devel-
9. See Henn, supra note 5, at 412.
10. New modes of communication are constantly being developed, and each
innovation raises new issues. See Note, Cable TV and Copyright Royalties, 83 YALE
L.J. 554 (1974); Lorr, Copyright, Computers, and Compulsory Licensing, 5 RUTGERS
J. COMPUTERS & L. 149 (1975).
11. NIMMER, supra note 6, at § 10-6. See Comment, One Copyright, Under
Goodis, Divisible? .... 1970 UTAH L. REv. 637.
12. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1976).
13. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 92 U.S. 390, 395-97
(1967).
14. Compare Frohman v. Fitch, 164 A.D. 231, 149 N.Y.S. 633 (1914) with Man-
ners v. Morosco, 252 U.S. 317 (1920).
15. See Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1968);
Goodis v. United Artists Television, Inc., 425 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1970).
16. See text accompanying notes 60-63 infra.
1979]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
oped, licenses played an increasingly important role. They be-
came a "means of deriving full economic benefit from a work
without surrendering ownership because they allowed an au-
thor, while retaining rights to the basic work, to grant limited
rights in derivative fields for consideration."' 7 For example, the
value of motion picture rights in a novel will often greatly ex-
ceed the value of the right to publish the work in book form.
In addition, magazine serialization rights have become a valua-
ble commodity, and, often an author will desire to license these
rights to create a larger market for his novel.'"
Modem business conditions make it economically unfeasi-
ble for an author to convey all rights in a work to one person
when the work has commercial value in other fields. Yet, under
indivisibility, the conveyance of anything less was not a con-
veyance of a proprietary right but only a mere license to use
the work.'9 The licensee did not have the power to bring suit
solely in his own name, nor secure statutory copyright protec-
tion, since the proprietary interest remained in the author.20
These ramifications of indivisibility sent courts2' and com-
mentators 2 on a chase to define the elusive distinctions be-
tween assignments and license, and the rights attached to
each, in an attempt to reconcile concepts of justice with a
doctrine that was becoming increasingly difficult and harsh.
Assignment or License
There have been endless attempts to define the distinction
between an assignment and a license. Broadly speaking, a
grant is an assignment if the grantee has full rights, and a grant
is a license if the grantor retains some rights under the copy-
right.23 The construction of these basic concepts has been a
perennial problem.
Professor Weil used the patent analogy, stating that "any
assignment of a copyright which does not convey the entire and
unqualified monopoly of the copyright proprietor, or any indi-
17. Comment, One Copyright, Under Goodis, Divisible? . . . 1970 UTAH L. REv.
637, 640.
18. See generally Cohn, Old Licenses and New Uses, Motion Pictures and Televi-
sion Rights, 19 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 184 (1954).
19. Hirshon v. United Artists Corp., 243 F.2d 640 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Goldwyn
Pictures Corp. v. Howells Sales Co., 282 F. 9 (2d Cir. 1922).
20. Field v. True Comics, Inc., 89 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); see 23 ALA. L.
REv. 169, 171 (1970).
21. County of Ventura v. Blackburn, 362 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1966); Hiawatha
Card Co. v. Colour Picture Publishers, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
22. See Henn, supra note 5, at 428-36.
23. See text accompanying notes 24-35 infra.
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vidual share thereunder, is to be deemed a license rather than
an assignment." 4 Henn noted that "an assignment involves
the transfer of the legal property or proprietorship, and the
assignee becomes the copyright proprietor," while a license is
a "strictly-construable, personal, contractual right." 5 He fur-
ther stated:
A license may be non-exclusive or exclusive. If non-
exclusive, the grant operates as a convenant by the licensor
not to sue the licensee for exercising rights under the li-
cense.26
If exclusive, the licensor also so covenants, and in addition,
undertakes not to make a similar grant to another, acting
as trustee for the benefit of the licensee with respect to the
rights exclusively licensed."
Commentators" have tried to sift through conflicting lines
of court decisions and isolate certain tests that have been used
in an attempt to find some sort of workable standard.
Partial reservation of rights test. The partial reservation of
rights test provides that if the proprietor reserves any rights in
making a transfer, the grant is a license.19 The test presents
problems in that the original proprietor can prejudice a grantee
of substantial rights by retaining any portion of those rights.
No distinction is made on the basis of the importance of the
rights transferred or reserved.30
Some courts have attempted to delineate the degree of
reservation needed in order for the grantor to be deemed to
have reserved sufficient proprietary interest in the work, al-
though decisions seem largely controlled by the circumstances
surrounding the conveyance. 31
24. WEIL, AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW 546 (1917).
25. Henn, supra note 5, at 429; see Stephens v. Howells Sales Co., Inc., 16 F.2d
805 (S.D.N.Y. 1926).
26. Henn, supra note 5, at 430-31 (citing April Productions, Inc. v. G. Schermer,
Inc., 308 N.Y. 366 (1955)).
27. Id. at 431.
28. See A. KAMINSTEIN, DIVISBILuTY OF COPYRIGHTS, STUDIES FOR SUBCOMM. ON
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, & COPYRIOHTS, STUDIES 11-13, at 12 (1957) [hereinafter cited
as KAMINSTEIN]; see Henn, supra note 5, at 433.
29. KAMINSTEIN, supra note 28, at 13.
30. Id.
31. The court in Gershwin v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 477, 478 (Ct. Cl. 1957),
stated that the "test is whether the owner retains ownership of the property right
concerned." In Brawley, Inc. v. Gaffney, 399 F. Supp. 115 (N.D. Cal. 1975), the court
held that retention of the right to republish copyrighted materials with the grantee's
permission was not a "retention of such rights that would defeat the attempted assign-
ment of the copyright" under which the transferor purported to assign all of its right,
title, and interest in the copyright. Id. at 117.
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Manifested- intention- to- transfer- the-proprietorship test.
Henn contends that examining the intention of the parties is
the most efficient way of determining whether proprietorship
was transferred."2 Under this test, the author may reserve
rights, but if the intention to transfer the proprietorship is
clear, the transfer is an assignment. In Droke House Publish-
ers, Inc. v. Aladdin Distributing Corp.,13 it was held that a
publisher had the right to bring an infringement action against
an infringer even though the author had reserved some rights
upon transfer. The fact that the publisher was specifically di-
rected to secure copyrights was held sufficiently indicative of
the intent to transfer a proprietary interest.3 ' Although this test
looks to the totality of circumstances surrounding the grant, its
effectiveness can still be diluted through mechanistic applica-
tions of terms of art.3 5
This traditional confusion over the distinction between
assignments and licenses should be alleviated by the new copy-
right law which allows for the divisibility of a copyright. When
that distinction is no longer a major difficulty, other problems
in the area of transfer of copyright ownership, such as standing
to sue and the right to claim a copyright, will be solved to a
comparable extent.
THE 1976 COPYRIGHT REVISION ACT AND THE PRINCIPLE OF
DIVISIBILITY
Section 201 (2)(d) of the 1976 Copyright Revision Act con-
tains the language of divisibility declaring that:
[Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright,
including any subdivision of any of the rights specified by
section 106, may be transferred. . . and owned separately.
The owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to
32. Henn, supra note 5, at 433.
33. 360 F. Supp. 311 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
34. But see Fitch v. Young, 230 F. 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1911). There the court dis-
missed an infringement action brought by an author because he was only a licensee.
The publisher secured statutory copyright, and pursuant to trade practice under indi-
visibility, re-assigned the copyright to the author and reserved only the publishing
right. The court found that the publisher intended to reserve the copyright and only
grant the rights to the underlying play to the author; thus, the author lost his proprie-
tary interest and became a mere licensee of his own work. This type of injustice is
representative of the kinds of abuse which led the way to adoption of divisibility.
35. Some courts have placed importance on the use of words like "license." See
Hampton v. Paramount Pictures, 279 F.2d 100, 103 (9th Cir. 1960). Others have held
that use of the word "assignment" is not controlling when the transfer is merely a
license. See Ilyin v. Avon Publications, 144 F. Supp. 368, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
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the extent of that right, to all of the protection and reme-
dies accorded to the copyright owner by this title. :"
The definition of "transfer of copyright ownership" in sec-
tion 101 of the Act specifically notes the severability of the
exclusive rights, and makes clear that the principle of divisibil-
ity applies whether or not the transfer is "limited in time or
place of effect.""7 The exclusive rights, which comprise the so-
called "bundle of rights" that is a copyright, are cumulative
and may overlap in some cases.3" Each of the five rights enu-
merated in section 106 (reproduction, adaptation, publication,
performance, and display) may be subdivided indefinitely and,
consistent with the new doctrine of divisibility, each subdivi-
sion of an exclusive right may be owned and enforced sepa-
rately.39
The exclusive rights in the first three subsections of section
106 are independent, although closely related. For example, the
exclusive right to prepare derivative works overlaps the exclu-
sive right of reproduction.'" It is broader, however, in that re-
production requires fixation in copies or records," whereas the
preparation of a derivative work may be an infringement even
though nothing is fixed in tangible form. Since each exclusive
right is now individually severable under divisibility it should
be easier to isolate and define the scope of each right even
though they may overlap.
In addition, the Act more effectively delineates the scope
36. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (1976).
37. 17 U.S.C. § 101 .(1976).
38. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 1hereinafter cited as H.R.
RF.p.], reprinted in 119761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 5659, 5674.
39. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976). Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of
copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the
following:
1. to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
2. to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
3. to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership,-or by rental, lease, or lend-
ing;
4. in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to per-
form the copyrighted work publicly; and
5. in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, display
the copyrighted work publicly.
Id.
40. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976).
41. Id. § 106(2); see H.R. REP., supra note 38, at 62, reprinted in 119761 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5675.
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of the exclusive rights in section 106. The right of public per-
formance in clause (4) of section 106 has been expanded to
include audiovisual works as well as motion pictures and has
dropped the outright "for profit" requirement of the 1909 Act. 2
"The line between commercial and nonprofit organization is
increasingly difficult to draw. Many nonprofit organizations
are highly subsidized and capable of paying royalties."'4 : This
expansion appears to be consistent with modern business reali-
ties. However section 114 of the Act limits the scope of the
performance right by stating that no right of performance ex-
tends to the exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a
sound recording." Section 106 (5) creates, for the first time, an
exclusive right to show a copyrighted work, or an image of it,
to the public. The extent and nature of this new right of display
is uncertain and subject to future modification.
The Act, by making each exclusive right severable and by
elevating the status of an exclusive licensee to one of proprie-
torship to the extent of that right, provides solutions to many
of the problems created by indivisibility.
The Effects of Divisibility on Problems of Transfer of
Ownership
In contrasting the effects of both doctrines-indivisibility
and divisibility of copyright-it is illuminating to focus on the
problems of standing to sue and the right to claim copyright.
The substantive significance of whether a transfer is an assign-
ment or a license is best displayed in these areas as well.
Standing to Sue. The most often cited rationale for indivi-
sibility was the protection of the alleged infringer from the
harassment of successive suits." Section 101(b) of the 1947 Act
required payment of damages to the "copyright proprietor."'
Since an assignment, under the indivisibility doctrine, re-
quired transfer in toto in order to convey proprietorship, this
42. Statutory copyright protection now begins upon creation of the work. That
is, when it is "fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
43. H.R. REP., supra note 38, at 62, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 5676.
44. H.R. RFP., supra note 38, at 106, reprinted in 119761 U.S. CODE CONG. &
An. NEWS at 5721.
45. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
46. Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 391, § 101(b), 61 Stat. 652 (17 U.S.C. § 101(b)
(1970)) read in part: "To pay to the copyright proprietor such damages as the copyright
proprietor may have suffered due to the infringement .
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meant that a licensee was not a proprietor, and therefore un-
able to bring suit solely in his own name.47
In order for a licensee to bring suit he was forced to join
the copyright proprietor. Exclusive licensees were deemed to
have some beneficial and equitable ownership interest in the
copyright and could sue if that right was violated, after fulfill-
ing joinder requirements." Non-exclusive licensees under the
indivisible copyright theory held no proprietary right, legal or
equitable, and had no standing in court. 9
These procedural requirements led to many instances of
injustice. In Ilyin v. Avon Publications,5 the court lamented
being presented with a case of an "exclusive licensee seeking
to sue a flagrant infringer, yet being unable to do so because
of his inability to join the foreign copyright owners as an indis-
pensible party." In Stephens v. Howells Sales Co.,"' the
licensee went so far as to pay the proprietor and to agree to hold
him harmless for all his expenses incidental to the litigation in
order to secure his presence in court. At the very least, the
procedural necessity of joinder was a pitfall.2
The new Act has made the necessary changes in this area.
Section 501 (b) specifically states that, "the legal or beneficial
owner of an exclusive, right under a copyright is entitled . . .
to institute an action for any infringement of that particular
right committed while he or she is the owner of it." This sec-
tion also discourages multiplicity of suits by allowing courts to
require written notice of suit, to compel joinder and to permit
intervention "of any person having or claiming an interest in
the copyright. ' '5 3
The practical effect of this new section is readily evident.
The status of an assignee remains intact. Exclusive licensees
no longer are forced to join copyright proprietors in order to
protect their rights. Non-exclusive licensees, while still having
to meet joinder requirements, are, at least, capable of bringing
47. See Vanatta, supra note 3, at 98.
48. See Bisel v. Ladner, 1 F.2d 436 (3d Cir. 1924).
49. See Goldwyn Pictures Corp. v. Howells Sales Co., 282 F. 9 (2d Cir. 1922).
50. 144 F. Supp. 368, 374-375 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
51. 16 F.2d 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1926).
52. See Ilyin v. Avon Publications, 144 F. Supp. at 375 (the court left its decree
open to let the plaintiff join the proprietor, involuntarily if necessary); NIMMER, supra
note 6, at 10-11; Vanatta, supra note 3, at 99; cf. Inge v. Twentieth Century Fox, 143
F. Supp. 294, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (delay in the issuance of an injunction can amount
to a denial of justice).
53. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1976); see H.R. REP., supra note 38, at 159, reprinted
in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5775.
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suit to protect their interests.
The major importance of this new section is that the law
now comports with established trade practices. Since copyright
is already industrially divisible,54 the recognition of this fact
can only promote more awareness of the scope of particular
rights within the copyright, and render unnecessary many of
the circuitous and burdensome methods of transfer involved in
basic entertainment business practices.
The Right to Claim Copyright
Nimmer maintains that "perhaps the most serious conse-
quence of the doctrine of indivisibility has occurred by reason
of the rule that upon publication copyright may be obtained
only if a notice appears in the name of the copyright proprie-
tor."55 The new Act, in de-emphasizing notice formalities, has
created a major change in the theoretical framework of Ameri-
can copyright law. First, the Act provides for statutory copy-
right protection when a work is created,5" and second, allows
that work to be published without causing the work to be lost
to the public domain. 7 These conceptual changes can best be
illustrated in the general context of collective works, and more
specifically by a hypothetical, but typical, fact situations in
the area of magazine rights."5
Periodicals and Authors' Rights: An Illustration. A, an
author of an unpublished and uncopyrighted manuscript,
grants to B, a magazine publisher, the right to reproduce the
work in his magazine. A reserves all other rights in the work,
such as motion picture and book publication. As is usually the
case, the magazine carries a copyright notice only in the name
of the publisher without a separate notice in A's name. Under
54. See KAMINSTEIN, supra note 28, at 17.
55. NIMMER, supra note 6, at 10-11.
56. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
57. 17 U.S.C. §§ 405, 406 (1976).
58. NIMMER, supra note 6, at 10-12. This is not to say that similar problems
concerning the right to claim do not arise in other areas. For example, a motion picture
producer may receive motion picture rights from an author and only place a copyright,
notice in the name of the proprietor of the film. The producer could then be deemed
only a licensee of the underlying work, and consequently the underlying work would
he injected into the public domain because, as a licensee, the producer is unable to
secure protection for it in the author's behalf. Id.
See Goldwyn Pictures Corp. v. Howells Sales Co., 282 F. 9 (2d Cir. 1922). For
applications to the book industry, see Bisel v. Ladner, 1 F.2d 436 (3d Cir. 1924), and
for music publishing, see Broadcast Music Inc. v. Taylor, 10 Misc. 2d 9, 55 N.Y.S.2d
94 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
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the doctrine of indivisibility, B is a licensee of A. Since he is
not a proprietor of the work, he is unable to claim copyright for
A's article. B's copyright for the magazine is valid but is not
sufficient to protect A's article because "a valid copyright may
be secured only when the name of all the interests in the work
appears in the copyright notice."59 Consequently, the work is
injected into the public domain.
The obvious inequity of the above situation has led many
courts, over the last few decades, to enlist a number of circui-
tous methods in order to prevent this inadvertent loss of copy-
right protection."0 Policy considerations dictate that "it is ex-
ecrable to deny an author, with both financial and artisitc
interest, the right to obtain copyright and thus protect the
fruits of his labor, simply because first publication occurred in
periodical form under a magazine copyright."'"
Similarly, under indivisibility, authors have been forced to
resort to various means in order to protect their work. In the
magazine context, unless the author transferred all rights to
the publisher, the work would fall into the public domain.12
Obviously, outright assignment of all rights would cause the
author to lose his interest in the work and would prevent the
often lucrative exploitation of the work in other fields. An au-
thor might demand that notice in his own name be placed in
the periodical along with his contribution. Few authors have
achieved the magnitude to demand such a provision, and most
authors were unaware of the legal consequences of failing to do
SO. 63
Since both author and publisher wish to secure protection
for initial publication, a practice developed in the industry
whereby the author would assign all rights to the publisher who
would transfer the rights back to the owner after publication.
The correct procedure requires two steps, since a simultaneous
grant and grant back may render the grantors' status as propri-
etor questionable. 4 In transferring rights back to the author, a
magazine had to first, assign the copyright in the story back to
the author, and second, in a separate document, take a license
59. 23 AlA. L. REV. 169, 171 (1970).
60. See Bisel v. Ladner, 1 F.2d 436 (1924) (trust theory). But cf. Geisel v. Poynter
Products, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331 (1968) (distinguishes Bisel on its facts).
61. 23 AIA. L. REV. 169, 174 (1970).
62. Dam v. Kirke La Shelle Co., 166 F. 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1908), aff'd, 175 F. 902
(2d Cir. 1910).
63. KAMINSTEIN, supra note 28, at 18; NIMMER, supra note 6, at 10-12.
64. Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 410 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1969).
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from the author for the rights they wished to retain. Unfortun-
ately, these arrangements were not always clear cut and diffi-
culties arose. 5
Most publishers are willing to abide by such retransfer
agreements. " If not, the courts can find a "trust" relationship
between the parties and may require the retransfer. 7 This legal
fiction is only a means to an end since the author has'no real
intention of transferring the entire literary property to the pub-
lisher in the first place. " Usually the courts examined industry
custom and usage in finding the existence of' an implied trust
relationship. The decision in Geisel v. Poynter Products, Inc.'"
virtually exploded that trust theory. The case involved the
transfer of rights in a series of cartoons by the now famous Dr.
Suess to a magazine in the 1930's. Although it examined indus-
try custom, the court held that because "there was no express
agreement that Liberty Magazine would hold the copyright in
trust for the plaintiff or that the plaintiff reserved any rights
in the cartoons,""1 ' there was no trust relationship. Although the
wisdom of this express agreement requirement has been ques-
tioned,7' the destructive effect of the decision on the implied
trust theory is self-evident.
Retransfer presents the possibility of severe difficulties for
the author. When retransferring, the magazine may justifiably
wish to retain certain rights in the work, usually serialization
or republication rights. Under strict indivisibility, this meant
that the "proprietor" (in this case the publisher) has reserved
some rights in the work, making the grantee (the author) a
mere licensee. If a magazine reserved the right to~reprint an
article at a later date when it retransferred the copyright to an
65. In Prather, the infringers maintained that the reservation of English lan-
guage rights to the novel rendered the grant back a mere license. This would have
prevented the author-licensee from bringing suit in his own name. See generally Was-
serstrom, The Copyrighting of Contributions to Composite Works, 31 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 381 (1956).
66. After initial publication, the interests of author and publisher are no longer
necessarily consistent and the publisher may not be interested in reconveying. See
Broadcast Music Inc. v. Taylor, 10 Misc. 2d 9, 55 N.Y.S.2d 94 (Sup. Ct. 1945). How-
ever, business realities and relationships usually were ample reason for honoring such
arrangements.
67. See Bisel v. Ladner, 1 F.2d 436 (3d Cir. 1924): Alexander v. Irving Trust Co.,
132 F. Supp. 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
68. See National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, 191 F.2d 594
(2d Cir. 1951).
69. 295 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
70. Id. at 337.
71. NIMMER, supra note 6, at 10-14.
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author, some courts might have deemed the'grant back to be a
license and not an assignment."
Thus, in order to prevent his work from falling into the
public domain the author may be forced to lose his right to sue
upon retransfer as well as possibly being restricted in other
attempts to use his work."1
There existed an obvious need to eliminate these circui-
tous devices used to protect an author's copyright, and it was
to this issue that the Second Circuit addressed itself in the
Goodis case.74
Goodis v. United Artists Television, Inc. " The Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, in the 1970 landmark Goodis decision,
expressly refused to apply indivisibility for the purpose of
claiming copyright. The court held that:
where a magazine has purchased the right of first publica-
tion under circumstances which show that the author has
no intention to donate his work to the public, copyright
notice in the magazine's name is sufficient to obtain a
valid copyright on behalf of the beneficial owner, the au-
thor, or proprietor."
This result foreshadowed the intent and effect of the new Act,
and was considered by some to have dealt a death blow to the
doctrine of indivisibility.7
In Goodis, the plaintiff author conveyed the exclusive film
rights in his unpublished novel, Dark Passage, to Warner
Brothers, and soon thereafter sold the serialization rights to
Curtis Publishing for use in The Saturday Evening Post.
Pursuant to that agreement, the story appeared in the maga-
zine in eight installments. Each of the eight issues contained
only a single copyright notice in the name of the periodical.
Warner Brothers released a movie by the same name75 and in
72. Eliot v. Geare-Marston, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 301 (E.D. Pa. 1939) (publisher
retained copyright and author was only a mere licensee). But see Witwer v. Harold
Lloyd Corp., 46 F.2d 792, 795 (S.D. Cal. 1930); see also, Commissioner v. Wodehouse,
337 U.S. 369, 400 app. C (1948).
73. See Colton, Contracts in the Entertainment and Literary Fields, in 1953
COPYRIGHT PROBLEMS ANALYZED 139 (CCH).
74. Goodis v. United Artists Television, Inc., 425 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1970).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 399.
77. NiMmEa, supra note 6, at 10-14.
78. Starring Humphrey Bogart and Lauren Bacall. "Man escapes from San
Quentin to prove himself innocent of murdering his wife. Occasionally good, but un-
even melodrama. (Dir: Delmer Daves, 106 mins.)" S. SCHEUER, MOVIES ON TV 168 (8th
ed. 1977).
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1965, the television show, "The Fugitive" was produced and
broadcast nationally by United Artists, Warner Brothers' as-
signee. Goodis7' sued for infringement and the district court
held that the work had been injected into the public domain
because the magazine copyright was insufficient to afford pro-
tection.8" The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and
declared that
the doctrine of indivisibility of copyright is a judge-made
rule which relates primarily to the requisite interest
needed to bring an infringement action . . .. [W]e do
not think it is determinative as to the requisite interest of
a party who may act to obtain copyright."
In making its decision, the court noted the reluctance of
other courts to invoke indivisibility "where the author or pro-
prietor of the work is the plaintiff and the result would be to
deprive the plaintiff of the fruits of his creative efforts."' ' The
court cited cases expounding the trust theory,"' and cases where
courts had engaged in the assignment-license debate,"4 but in
the end justified their rejection of indivisibility in this context
on common sense and the "liberalizing spirit" of the 1909
Copyright Act. 5 The court also emphasized that the charac-
terization of the publisher as assignee or licensee was second-
ary and concluded that "where the question is the interest
needed to obtain copyright . . . the important considerations
are the intention of the parties to obtain copyright and the
adequacy of notice to the public.""8
Although the Goodis decision has been criticized for creat-
ing artificial distinctions between the right to bring suit and
the right to obtain copyright, 7 and has been distinguished by
79. The plaintiff died while the action was pending, and his estate was substi-
tuted in his place. 425 F.2d at 399.
80. See Goodis v. United Artists Television, Inc., 278 F. Supp. 122 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
81. 425 F.2d at 400.
82. Id.; see Houghton Mifflin Co. v. Stockpole Sons, Inc., 104 F.2d 306 (2d Cir.
1939).
83. See Bisel v. Ladner, 1 F.2d 436 (3d Cir. 1924).
84. Egner v. E.C. Schirmer Music Co., 139 F.2d 398 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 322
U.S. 730 (1943); Mail & Express Co. v. Life Publishing Co., 192 F. 899 (2d Cir. 1912).
85. 425 F.2d at 402. The court was cognizant of modem business practices and
recognized that many magazines market new writings in serial form and that this will
often be the "first publication" of the work. "[Tihe magazine's own notice of copy-
right is more than adequate to appraise any innocent party that he might be infringing
another's copyright." Id. at 403.
86. Id.
87. 1970 UTAH L. REV., supra note 11, at 642.
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other circuits," the import of the decision was great, and in
addition to offering hope to authors, it was an effective prelude
to the passage of the 1976 Copyright Revision Act.8'
The 1976 Revision Act. Section 201 (c) of the new Act deals
with the problem of the relationship between copyright owner-
ship in a contribution and the collective work, such as a maga-
zine, in which it appears. The subsection begins by stating that
"copyright in each separate contribution to a collective work is
distinct from copyright in the collective work as a whole, and
vests initially in the author of the contribution.""' This com-
ports with the new concept that copyright protection now vests
upon creation,"' and means that an author is no longer depen-
dent on a periodical in order to secure copyright. In fact, the
new Act explicitly insures that the contribution is distinct from
the collective work, providing that "in the absence of an ex-
press transfer of the copyright or of any rights under it, the
owner of copyright in the collective work is presumed to have
acquired only the privilege of reproducing and distributing the
contribution."" The presumption, one of the most significant
achievements of the legislation,"3 simply means that an author
can now simply grant a license to a publisher and not have to
worry about retransfer arrangements, trust relationships, or
losing his or her copyright if the article appears without sepa-
rate notice.
Section 404 of the new Act, dealing with copyright notice,
read in conjunction with section 201(c), specifically provides
that a single notice covering the entire collective work will
protect a single author's contribution. Further, this protection
is achieved even without an unqualified transfer of rights to the
owner of the collective work."4
This section is consistent with the new doctrine of divisi-
bility, and with trade practices. It gives authors substantially
88. Letter Edged in Black Press v. Public Bldg. Comm'n of Chicago, 320 F.
Supp. 1303 (N.D. I1. 1970). The distinguishing fact, to the Black Press court, was that
in Goodis "the magazine had purchased a property interest in the novel, i.e., the right
of first publication . . . [tihe publishers in the case at bar had no interest whatever
in the pictures of the work that they published." 320 F. Supp. at 1312.
89. The Goodis court cited sections 201(c) and 403(a) of the proposed legislation
that became part of the 1976 Revision Act.
90. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1976).
91. Id. See note 16 supra.
92. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1976) (emphasis added).
93. H.R. REP., supra note 38, at 122, reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws at 5738.
94. 17 U.S.C. § 404(a) (1976).
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more protection for their work, and it establishes a right for
publishers to retain revision and republication rights in a con-
tribution ."
DIVISIBILITY AND JOINT COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP
The concept of divisible copyright raises an interesting
issue with respect to the area of co-ownership of literary prop-
erty. Since, under divisibility, individual rights comprising the
copyright are severable and capable of assignment, the ques-
tion is raised whether one joint owner, without the consent of
the others, can sever one right from the whole and grant an
exclusive right to a third party.
Before drawing any conclusions it is necessary to outline
some basic statutory definitions and accepted judge-made
rules, and to present a short hypothetical situation to facilitate
better understanding of the issues involved.
Definition of Joint Ownership-The New Act
Section 201 of the Act states that "copyright in a work
protected under this title vests initially in the author or authors
of the work. The authors of a joint work are co-owners of copy-
right in that work."' 6 Section 101 defines "joint work" as a
"work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that
their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdepen-
dent parts of a unitary whole."' 7 A report on the legislation
noted that:
The touchstone here is the intention, at the time the
writing is done, that the parts be absorbed or combined
into an integrated unit, although the parts themselves
may be either 'inseparable' (i.e. novel or painting) or
'interdependent' (i.e. motion picture, words and music to
a song)."
95. Id. § 201(c).
96. Id. § 201(a).
97. Id. § 101 (1976).
98. H.R. REP., supra note 38, at 120, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 5736. Since the 1909 Act omitted any reference to joint ownership, courts
have long struggled with the problem of determining whether a joint work has been
created. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 221 F.2d 569 (2d Cir.),
modified on rehearing, 223 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955) (12th Street Rag case); Edward B.
Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 42 F. Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Shap-
iro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 161 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
331 U.S. 820 (1947) (Melancholy Baby case).
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This definition is different than the definition of
"collective work," also in section 101. Although there is some-
times confusion between the two terms, a collective work is "a
work, such as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in
which a number of contributions, constituting separate and
independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collec-
tive whole."" The basic distinction between the two is that in
a joint work, such as a novel, the separate elements merge into
a unified whole, and in a collective work, such as a magazine,
the individual contributions remain unintegrated and dispar-
ate. Consequently, in a collective work the author of a contri-
bution is the initial owner of his work, and his copyright is
distinct from the copyright in the collective work as a whole.""
However, in a joint ownership situation, "no one of the authors
alone owns the 'joint work' or any particular right therein; all
co-authors together own all the rights in the one work."""
Joint works are also sometimes confused with derivative
works in situations where a grant of motion picture rights, for
example, results in an end product based on the underlying
work, but the author(s) of the underlying work are considered
co-owners of that derivative work. The new Act defines a deriv-
ative work as one "based upon one or more pre-existing works,
such as a translation, musical arrangement . . . or any
other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or
adapted."" 2 The definition requires that the work, as a whole,
represent an original work of authorship."" Section 103 (b) goes
further in an attempt to define the scope of derivative works
by stating that "the copyright in a derivative work extends
only to the material contributed by the author of such work,
as distinguished from the pre-existing material employed in
the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the pre-
existing material."'' 4
The legislative history makes clear the intent that an
author of a previously written work, such as a play or novel, will
not be converted into a co-author of a derivative work, such as
a motion picture, unless the author does, in fact, actually work
99. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
100. See id. § 201.
101. Cary, Joint Ownership of Copyrights, in STUDIES FOR SUBCOMMITTEE ON
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, study no. 12, at 87 (1958) thereinafter cited
as Caryl.
102. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
103. Id.
104. Id. § 103(b).
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on the picture. Thus, although an author may hope that his
work will eventually be used in a motion picture, this is not
sufficient to create a joint work.'0 5
Commentators generally separate problems of divisibility
and co-ownership even though "suits by one co-owner against
an infringer occasionally present much the same problems,
especially with respect to possible joinder of parties and multi-
ple recovery as do cases involving divisibility.""' George Cary
distinguished between the two on the basis that divisibility
concerns the question of transferring ownership of one of the
several rights comprised in a copyright so that different persons
own different rights in a work, with any particular right having
one owner.' 7 Under present law, co-ownership rules are only
concerned with the rights of the co-owners in the copyright as
a whole, and not with respect to the individual rights within.
Incidents of Joint Ownership
The rights and duties of co-owners have been extensively
developed in the courts and the new Act generally leaves these
doctrines undisturbed. Co-owners of a copyright are treated as
tenants in common, with each co-owner having an independent
right to use or license the use of a work, subject to the duty of
accounting to the other co-owners. 0 The comparison to ten-
ancy in common between co-owners stems from the early case
of Carter v. Bailey.'10 There the court established the equal
rights of co-owners to use or license the work without permis-
sion, and supported its decision with the policy consideration
that unanimous consent of all owners is detrimental to the
public interest in having quick access to new works of art, since
one co-owner may unreasonably withold his consent."'0
105. H.R. REP., supra note 38, at 120, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 5736.
106. KAMINSTEIN, supra note 28, at 16.
107. Cary, supra note 101, at 87.
As noted earlier, a joint work is owned by all co-owners as an undivided piece of
property. Although one owner may license the use of a particular right, any attempted
assignment of a particular right is construed as an assignment of that owner's interest
in the work as a whole and his assignee and the other co-owners become joint owners.
This writer, however, questions the validity of this distinction and feels that the two
concepts of divisibility and joint ownership can be reconciled. See Shapiro, Bernstein
& Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 221 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1955) (12th St. Rag case).
108. H.R. REP., supra note 38, at 121, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 5736.
109. 64 Me. 458 (1874).
110. Id. at 463. The exclusive rights granted in article 1, section 8, of the U.S.
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The development of the rule of accountability has been a
lengthy one,"' but in its present statutory form reflects the
growth of modern business practices. Today, most authors can
not successfully exploit their own works but have to depend on
publishers, producers, and the like who are in the business of
exploiting such works." 2 Such persons should be able to exploit
the joint work to its fullest but should also be made to account
for profits to the other co-owners. Cary comments that the
development of the accounting principle provided a brake
upon the unbridled ambition of a co-owner who might be
inclined to disregard the rights of his colleagues and at the
same time served a useful purpose in permitting an ener-
getic co-owner the right to profit from his original labor in
creating the work."'
Thus, the state of American copyright law is that any co-
owner may use or license the joint work subject only to a duty
of accounting."' However, since a joint work, by definition, is
an undivided whole, the right of one co-owner to license the use
of the work is limited to non-exclusive rights unless unanimous
consent is given. "A corollary to the right of free exploitation
would be the inability of one co-owner to give an exclusive
license.""' , This rule stems from the fact that since co-owners
have mutual rights to use the work, a licensee can be deemed
to be on notice of the possibility of other licenses being given
by one or more of the other owners. "'
Constitution were "created and conferred upon authors as a compensation for their
contributions to the promotion of general knowledge." Id. at 462.
111. See Crosney v. Edward Small Products, 52 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1942);
Maurel v. Smith, 220 F. 195, 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1915), aff'd, 271 F. 211 (2d Cir. 1921);
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 221 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1955).
112. Davidson, Problems in Co-Ownership of Copyrights, 8 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
1035, 1042 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Problems].
Many publishers and producers become, in effect, co-owners through assignment
of a percentage of co-owners' interest in the literary property as consideration for his
abilities and efforts. The exploiting co-owner is usually not an author but an assignee
with the ability to publish on a large scale. See Spencer & Stone, Creating and Preserv-
ing a Copyright, 14 NoTRE DAME LAw. 362, 370 (1939); 72 H~Av. L. REV. 1550 (1959).
113. Cary, supra note 101, at 108, 109.
114. See Problems, supra note 112, at 1044-46. An action for conversion is avail-
able to a co-owner if he feels that the actions of another co-owner have "destroyed"
the work. See Brown v. Republic Products, Inc., 26 Cal. 2d 867, 161 P.2d 796 (1945).
While this concept is theoretically capable of application, it has proved difficult to
employ. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 161 F.2d 406 (2d Cir.
1946) (Melancholy Baby case); Herbert v. Fields, 152 N.Y.S. 487 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term
1915).
115. Problems, supra note 112, at 1040; see Annot., 3 A.L.R.3d 1324 (1965).
116. Emphasis on the perception of a licensee is instructive in that it is the right
of the licensee to exploit the licensee's work, and to protect his interest in the work,
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The Effect of Divisible Copyright
The inquiry into whether one co-owner may grant an ex-
clusive right to a third party without the consent of the other
co-owners, becomes particularly pertinent now that the con-
cept of divisible copyright has been adopted.
Since the individual's exclusive rights comprising the
copyright are now separately assignable and protectable, the
scope of one co-owner's right to license, heretofore limited to
non-exclusive rights, may perhaps be expanded to encompass
exclusive rights.
Although not all joint projects end in discord, the following
hypothetical presents a typical situation where communication
between co-owners has broken down. A and B are co-authors
of a novel. A wishes to license to C, a motion picture studio,
the motion picture rights in the novel. B refuses to consent to
the transaction. It is uncontroverted that A could license the
use of the novel to C, and that C would be immunized from
liability to B for copyright infringement."7 However, this li-
cense would be non-exclusive, and B could grant similar licen-
ses if he chose to do so. Effectively this means that the grant
of a license from one co-owner of a copyright without the con-
sent of the other is worthless due to the tenuous proprietary
interest which the license conveys."'
Professor Nimmer agrees that "since most commercial
purchasers of literary and musical properties require the ac-
quisition of an exclusive right, the non-exclusive rights of co-
owners are for all practical purposes unsalable.""' He suggests
the adoption of the British concept of co-ownership that re-
quires unanimous consent of all co-owners for use or licensing
of the work. While this theory creates more security for the co-
owners, it contradicts the underlying American belief in un-
that is threatened by a unilateral non-exclusive grant by one co-owner. It seems the
law should protect an innocent licensee from subsequent licenses being given by an-
other, perhaps unknown, co-owner.
117. See McKay v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc., 324 F.2d 762 (2d Cir.
1963); Donna v. Dodd, Mead, & Co., 374 F. Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
118. No producer would make the "substantial investment necessary to produce
and promote a picture if another producer could lawfully release a picture dealing with
the same subject and bearing an identical title." Denker v. Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp., 10 N.Y.2d 339, 346, 179 N.E.2d 336, 338 (1961); see Hollywood Plays, Inc.
v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 299 N.Y. 61, 85 N.E.2d 865 (1949).
119. M. Nimmer, letter to Copyright Office, reprinted in COMMENTS AND VIEWS
SUBMITTED TO THE COPYRIGHT OFFICE ON JOINT OWNERSHIP OF COPYRIGHTS, STUDIES FOR
SUCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, STUDIES 11-13, at 118 (1958).
[Vol. 19
DIVISIBILITY OF COPYRIGHT
restrained production and exploitation of works of art.2 "
Under the British system, one co-owner, for whatever rea-
son, can withold his consent to any contemplated transaction
and thus effectively prevent the use of that work. Nimmer
contends that the unsalability of co-ownership rights under
American law is ample reason for adoption of a unitary concept
as long as it "includes some provision whereby a co-owner may
grant an exclusive license notwithstanding the refusal of an-
other co-owner to join in such a license where such a refusal is
established as unreasonable."''
Rather than adopting the British unitary concept, this
writer feels that the adoption of divisibility in American law
may provide the solution. Since the conveyance of a non-
exclusive right is economically unfeasible in modern entertain-
ment business practices, the power of a co-owner to use the
joint work is severely limited. In essence a single co-owner
would need to convey an exclusive license in order to transfer
sufficient proprietary interest to a third party. Under indivisi-
bility, this was clearly impossible. A transfer of sufficient pro-
prietary interest would have required a transfer of all rights
under the copyright, and this was clearly beyond the scope of'
a single co-owner's power.
Under divisibility, the law specifically provides for severa-
ble rights. If A, in the hypothetical, had written the novel
alone, he would be able to grant an exclusive license to C to
use the novel and still retain proprietary interest in the whole
copyright. C would have received a sufficient proprietary inter-
est in the novel to defend that interest against an alleged infrin-
ger. In essence, reality dictates the necessity of exclusive rights.
Therefore, the law should conform with this reality.'22
An analogy to partnership law may show how divisible
copyright can provide the effective right of independent use for
120. "Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation
must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature,
music, and the other arts." Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151,
156 (1975); see Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1931).
121. M. Nimmer, supra note 119, at 118.
122. "It would be most helpful to publishers if one joint owner could convey an
interest without the joinder of the others, but it would seem appropriate to require that
one account to the others for profit." Robert Gibbon, Curtis Publishing Co., letter to
Copyright Office, reprinted in COMMENTS AND VIEWS SUBMITTED TO THE COPYRIGHT
OFFICE ON JOINT OWNERSHIP OF COPYRIGHTS, STUDIES FOR SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADE-
MARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, STUDIES 11-13, at 18 (1958).
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co-owners of a copyright.":' Assume that A and B, in the hypo-
thetical above, are partners as well as co-owners of the copy-
right in the novel. As partners, both authors have equal rights
in the management of the partnership."4 It is generally ac-
cepted that all acts of a partner which are apparently within
the usual course of the partnership business bind the partner-
ship.' 5 The purpose of A and B's partnership would be the
commercial exploitation of their joint literary work. Acting in
his capacity as agent of the partnership, ' A could convey the
motion picture rights in the novel to C, and this transaction
would be binding since it is within the usual course of the
partnership business.
Application of this partnership analogy will facilitate rec-
ognition of A's effective right of independent use of the joint
work. As co-owners, with mutual rights of use, each should be
able to bind the other by way of a transaction reasonably suited
to furthering the purpose of their collaboration. Since exclusive
rights are now capable of individual licensing, it seems logical
to provide a co-owner with the ability to transfer one of these
rights. This independent right of use should have some restric-
tions. The duty of accounting would remain intact, and any
profits derived will be for the benefit of all the co-owners. This
means that B would derive profit from A's conveyance to C of
the movie rights in their novel. However, B would no longer be
able to thwart the exploitation of the work by witholding his
consent to the transaction.'
Another possible safeguard would be a notice requirement.
Before a transaction is completed, notice could be sent to all
co-owners explaining the possibilities presented by the transac-
tion. This would give the other owners an opportunity to join
in the conveyance or perhaps exert pressure on the consenting
co-owner to refrain from the conveyance. Although this might
create a "race to sign" between the co-owners, the fact that
each co-owner knows that the others are capable of successfully
transferring rights should facilitate greater communication
123. This writer presents the analogy only for purposes of illustration and makes
no claim as to its validity for application to co-ownership rules.
124. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr § 18(e).
125. Id. § 9.
126. Id. § 9(1).
127. Thus, rather than creating a "new" right for the consenting co-owner, we
are in effect removing an unwarranted right from the non-consenting owner. That is,
the non-consenting owner has lost his ability to reasonably thwart a commercial trans-
action. This is consistent with American copyright philosopy which supports unres-
trained production of works of art. See notes 100, 121 supra.
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between them.2 8 This would result in the attainment of a bet-
ter deal for the benefit of the co-ownership and in quicker ac-
cess of the general public to the work.
This new system would also result in the creation of a more
secure proprietary interest in the licensee consistent with the
principles of the new Act. C, in the hypothetical above, would
have the ability to protect his interests in the exclusive right
since the new law elevates exclusive licensees to proprietorship
status. This would further the policy of lessening joinder re-
quirements and safeguard against multiplicity of suits against
alleged infringers.
In sum, under divisible copyright, co-owners should have
the right to sever individual exclusive rights comprising the
joint copyright, and the right to convey them without the per-
mission of the remaining co-owners, subject to the duties of
accounting and notice.
CONCLUSION
The adoption of the doctrine of divisibility in our copyright
law will have a profound effect on many aspects of the enter-
tainment industry. This comment has attempted to isolate its
effects on some of the major problems its adoption was in-
tended to remedy. Under divisible copyright, an exclusive li-
censee will now be able to sue in his own name to protect his
interest in a copyrighted work. Non-exclusive licensees, while
still forced to meet procedural joinder requirements, are now
at least capable of bringing suit. The new Act proclaims that
an author no longer be dependent on a publisher, periodical
proprietor, or producer to secure copyright protection since
that protection now vests in the author upon creation.
This comment has proposed a novel application of divisi-
bility to remedy problems which a single co-owner faces if he
attempts a unilateral conveyance of any exclusive right in the
joint work. By applying the concept of divisible and severable
exclusive rights, a single co-owner may no longer be unreasona-
bly hampered in attempts to successfully exploit the joint work
of art.
In sum, recognition of divisibility is more than just a rem-
edy for industry problems. It is essentially an adoption of a new
128. This "race to sign" already exists today and is a necessary corollary to the
right of mutual use which is the backbone of American copyright law. This author feels
that the theory expounded here will prevent rather than aggravate this situation for
the reasons stated in the text.
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theoretical framework for American copyright law. It is recog-
nition of a modern business and artistic reality-that a copy-
right is comprised of many individual rights, each capable of
separate and distinct methods of production and exploita-
tion.' 9
Elliot Groffman
129. This comment was awarded first prize at the University of Santa Clara
School of Law in the 1978 Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition sponsored by the
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers.
